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Insights from the health service in England 
 
ABSTRACT 
The abolition of the Audit Commission in England and Wales removes the ‘protector of the 
public purse’. The oversight body and its audit practice are largely replaced by the private 
sector regime and audit firms. We analyse the audit market for health service foundation 
trusts, an area of local public audit that operates without oversight from the Commission. 
We find evidence of premiums paid to some Big4 firms and that the presence of specialist 
public service auditors results in fee discounts. The firms limit their liability and assurance 
of audit quality is reduced under new audit regimes and governance structures. 
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The removal of a specialist oversight body for local public audit: 
Insights from the health service in England 
 
1 Introduction 
We explore the implications of the removal of the Audit Commission in England and Wales.  
For decades, the Audit Commission (website logo - ‘protecting the public purse’) was 
responsible for appointing auditors from its own specialist audit service and those of 
approved audit firms for local government and National Health Service (NHS) bodies. In 
2012, the Commission was responsible for the audit appointments to 353 local authorities, 
263 health bodies, 76 police authorities, 82 other bodies and 10,000 small bodies such as 
parish councils (Audit Commission, 2013). The Commission set fee scales; determined the 
audit work (the Audit Code) including performance audits, and monitored the quality of the 
audit work. 
 
In 2010, the government announced the abolition of the Audit Commission. The Secretary 
of State for Communities and Local Government claimed - 
"The Audit Commission has lost its way. Rather than being a watchdog that 
champions taxpayers' interests, it has become the creature of the Whitehall state. 
"We need to redress this balance. Audit should remain to ensure taxpayers' 
money is properly spent, but this can be done in a competitive environment, 
drawing on professional audit expertise across the country.  
“These proposed changes go hand in hand with plans to create an army of 
armchair auditors –local people able to hold local bodies to account for the way 
their tax pounds are spent and what that money is delivering.” 
BBC, August 2010.  
 
The dismantling of the Audit Commission commenced. In 2010 the Commission ceased to 
assess the performance of local public bodies. In 2012 the Commission’s audit practice 
work transferred to private sector firms and it was proposed that all local public bodies in 
England appoint their own auditors and the regulation of local public audit transfer to the 
Financial Reporting Council (DCLG 2012). Alongside the dismantling of the Commission, 
an army of armchair auditors would hold local organizations to account by examining their 
detailed transactions that would be made available through websitesi (DCLG 2011). 
 
We investigate the likely impact of the dismantling of the Commission. The introduction of 
NHS Foundation Trusts from 2004 had provided an area of local public audit that was 
outside the oversight of the Audit Commission. Foundation Trusts (FTs), unlike NHS trusts, 
had the ability from their inception, to appoint their own auditors, they were  not subject to 
audit fee scales, definition of their work or monitoring by the Commission. An analysis of 
the audit arrangements and fees in FTs in recent years therefore provides some insights into 
how local public audit in other parts of the public sector may fare in terms of price and 
quality after the abolition of the Audit Commission. 
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 In the next section we consider audit quality and oversight bodies as applied in a public 
sector context. We then present the audit arrangements for both NHS trusts (with Audit 
Commission oversight) and Foundation Trusts (without Audit Commission oversight) and 
develop our hypotheses on audit pricing. Based on private sector literature of audit fees and 
earlier studies in NHS trusts we produce a departure model for FT audit fees related to size, 
complexity, location and risk. We derive hypotheses on audit fees in relation to different 
types of auditor for testing to explore whether the removal of the Audit Commission 
changes prior findings in the NHS trust audit market. This design is outlined in section five 
and our results are set out in section six, followed by discussion and conclusions.  
 
2 External audit quality and oversight bodies 
In recent years, oversight bodies have sought to enhance external audit quality. External 
audits of financial statements are mandated because the ownership and management of 
organisations have become increasingly separated (Porter et al, 2008). The financial 
statements form the basis of the account, and the independent review and report on those 
statements by the external auditor improves the credibility of the account and hence 
accountability. Porter et al (2008) claim the benefits are reflected in the fundamental 
principle of auditing: 
‘Auditors add to the reliability and quality of financial reporting [to external 
parties]; they provide to directors and officers [of the auditee] constructive 
observations arising from the audit process; and thereby contribute to the 
effective operation of business capital markets and the public sector.’  
Auditing Practices Board, 2008, Appendix 2 
 
Under democratic government, accountability for public money and the role of the auditor is 
increased (Chan, 2003). This wider audit role is explained by Stewart (1984) and Sharman 
(2001): the public sector auditor, in addition to the need to attest to the ‘true and fair view’ 
of the financial statements, must ensure regularity, propriety and value for money. Auditors 
are required to publish public interest reports when they feel it necessary to bring to the 
attention of the audited body and the public any significant matter arising in the course of an 
auditii. 
 
The independence of an external audit body is integral to its quality in the accountability 
process (Hollingsworth et al, 1998) and is emphasised in auditing texts.  
‘The significance of independence in the work of the independent auditor is so 
well established that little justification is needed to establish this concept as one 
of the cornerstones in any structure of auditing theory.’ 
Mautz and Sharaf (1961) The Philosophy of Auditing. 
 
Independence refers both to independence from the audited body and to having an 
independent (objective) state of mind (DeAngelo, 1981; Mautz and Sharaf, 1961). 
Independence is ‘widely thought to be necessary for the quality of audits’ (Jamal and 
Sunder, 2011:284). Lord Sharman’s review of audit arrangements in the UK made it clear 
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that to safeguard independence public sector organisations should not be able to appoint 
their own auditorsiii: 
‘auditors must be independent to avoid improper influence and allow work to be carried 
out freely. Independence is considered to encompass the methods of appointment of 
auditors, the financial relationship between auditor and auditees, discretion in the amount 
of work necessary, the ability to follow up the implementation of recommendations, and 
the ability to have access to information in the custody of the audited body necessary for 
the work.’ 
     Paragraph 3.39  Sharman (2001) 
 
The quality of the audit is also dependent on the knowledge and expertise of the auditor. 
The audit of public sector organisations is frequently the exclusive domain of specialist 
auditorsiv, but in England, private firms have undertaken some local public audits since 
1972. Specialist public sector auditors could arguably have enhanced knowledge and 
expertise. However, there is a substantial body of empirical evidence in the private sector, 
particularly in the United States, that is consistent with the largest accounting firms 
providing higher quality audits: the largest accounting firms were named defendants in 
lawsuits proportionately less than other auditors (Fuerman, 2000); and the largest 
accounting firms are sued at a lower frequency per estimated audit performed than other 
auditors (Palmrose, 1988). Thus, it has long been argued that larger accounting firms supply 
a higher level of audit quality and hence lend greater credibility to the audited financial 
statements than smaller firms (Dopuch and Suminic, 1980 and 1982; DeAngelo, 1981). A 
common rationale for this proposition is the depth of the auditors’ pocket. The deep pockets 
hypothesis (Wallace, 1980), states that large accounting firms have more incentives to issue 
accurate reports because they have greater wealth at risk from litigation. Thus the quality 
aspect of specialist knowledge of public sector auditors may be countered by the quality 
engendered by the deep pockets of large private firms. 
 
Audit oversight bodies seek to increase the quality of the audit by ensuring greater 
independence of the auditor from the audit client and monitoring their work (Malsch and 
Gendron, 2011). Audit oversight of UK local government was introduced through the 
setting up of the Audit Commission in England and Wales in 1983. In 1991, the Audit 
Commission extended its role to NHS trusts. The Audit Commission also had its own audit 
practice (District Auditv), the Commission assigned the audit of local authorities and NHS 
trusts to its audit practice  and accredited private sector audit firms; typically private firms 
undertook 30% of local authority and NHS trust audits under the oversight of the Audit 
Commission. Thus, auditors were appointed by the Commission, not the organisation (the 
auditee). The fees and the quality of the work were set and monitored by the Commission. 
The Commission has also been seen as an agent of central government in ensuring improved 
public service performance (Walker et al, 2011), but assessment and inspection work led to 
it being viewed as a ‘creature of the Whitehall State’ by the Secretary of State (BBC, 
August 13th 2010) and this work ceased in 2010.. 
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In the commercial world, audit oversight boards are a recent innovation. Following the 
collapse of Enron (and their auditors Arthur Andersen) in 2001, the independence of audit 
firms from their auditees and the quality of their audit work was the subject of intense 
debate and scrutiny (Malsch and Gendron, 2011). As a result, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
became US federal law in 2002 under which the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB), a private-sector non-profit corporation, was created. The stated purpose of 
the Act was to "protect the interests of investors and further the public interest in the 
preparation of informative, fair, and independent audit reports". The PCAOB under Section 
101 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has substantial powers, including the power to register 
public accounting firms that prepare audit reports for issuers and set auditing, quality 
control, ethics, independence and other standards relating to the preparation of audit reports. 
Part of the PCAOB's power to set rules of the auditing industry includes the power to 
regulate the non-audit services that audit firms may offer their audit clients (such as 
consulting or tax services). In cases such as Enron and Worldcom, auditors' independence 
from their clients' managers had been compromised because of the large fees that audit 
firms earned from these non-audit services.  
In the UK, the Conduct Committee (previously the Professional Oversight Board) of the 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) provides independent oversight of the regulation of the 
auditing profession. The Committee through its Audit Quality Review (AQR) team, 
formerly the Audit Inspection Unit monitors the quality of the audits of listed and other 
major public interest entities under the 2006 Companies Actvi. From 1st April 2013 the 
review of policies and procedures of those firms with ten or fewer ‘major’ audit clients will 
be delegated in full to the professional bodies with which the firms are registered for audit 
purposes such as the ICAEW. The FRC also produces corporate governance codes that rely 
on investors to ensure company adherence. 
Internationally, there is a growing body of evidence that client retention incentives and 
accountability pressures threaten audit independence and that an oversight board enhances 
independence (Koch et al, forthcoming). The European Commission’s 2010 Green Paper on 
‘Audit Policy: Lessons from the crisis’ recommends third party oversight of audits 
(Humphrey et al, 2011). Despite this background of increasing interest in audit oversight 
bodies, the Secretary of State made his decision, to abolish the Audit Commission –the 
Commission’s audit practice would be outsourced for the audit of the 2012/13 accounts. The 
Audit Commission, significantly smaller, would remain in place for a few years to oversee 
contracts for local public services in England. The central top down approach of holding 
local public bodies to account would be replaced by providing detailed information such as 
payments over £500 and senior employee salaries to an ‘army of armchair auditors’ (local 
residents and taxpayers). Our study in health service foundation trusts explores the quality 
(independence, specialist expertise) and price implications of the removal of an oversight 
body for local public audit. 
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3 External audit in the National Health Service 
In the NHS in England, the provision of hospital services is provided by NHS Trusts and 
Foundation Trusts. Since 2004, NHS Trusts have been able to apply for Foundation Trust 
(FT) status. It is intended that all NHS trusts will become FTs. 
 
NHS trusts are accountable via health authorities to the Department of Health. The Audit 
Commission appointed the auditors from its in-house auditors or private firms, set audit fee 
scales, monitored audit quality and assessed VFM and performance (Audit Commission 
2010a). Private sector auditors were invited to tender for the audits by the Audit 
Commission and were only appointed if they could show they had the necessary capacity 
and capabilities (Audit Commission, 1998). The scale of audit fees for individual NHS 
bodies comprised: a fixed element, for different types of audited bodies; an element related 
to gross expenditure and a regional premium for audits in London and the South East of 
England. Fees could be above or below the scale when the Audit Commission considered 
that substantially more or less work was required than envisaged by the scale fee. However, 
the Audit Commission did not expect to vary the scale fee by more than 30 per cent, 
upwards or downwards. The quality of the audit work of appointed auditors was reviewed 
by the Audit Commission. The annual quality review programme included quarterly reviews 
of compliance with regulatory requirements and the Code; annual sampling of work on audit 
of financial statements, use of resources and value for money (VFM), written audit reports 
and certification (Audit Commission, 2010b). The Audit Commission promoted good 
practice and provided a forum for discussion and guidance on technical issues. 
 
However, FTs have greater independence than NHS trusts and they are directly accountable 
to Parliament. Monitor, the independent regulator of foundation trusts, provides a 
recommended governance code for FTs. The governance structure of a typical FT is shown 
in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: The Governance Structure of a Foundation Trust 
 
The membership is drawn from the local community (the public, patients and staff). The 
membership and the stakeholder organisations, such as universities or city councils, 
nominate and elect governors. The board of governors appoints the chair and non-executive 
directors (NEDs). They in turn appoint the chief executive who together with the chair and 
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NEDs appoints the executive directors. In a FT, governors replace shareholders, it is the 
governors who appoint the auditors on advice from the audit committee and it is to the 
governors that the auditors address their report. 
 
There have been several studies examining the audit arrangements of NHS Trusts under the 
oversight of the Audit Commission (Clatworthy et al, 2000, 2002, 2008; Basioudis and 
Ellwood, 2005a, 2005b; Ballentine et al, 2008), but none on audit in FTs. Table 1 shows the 
changes in the NHS Trust audit market observed from these studies. 
Table 1. The Observed Audit Market for NHS Trusts  
  2000* 2004** 2005*** 
  N % N % N % 
Big4 firms 106 28.42% 74 28.24% 52 31.14% 
2nd tier firms 20 5.36% 23 8.78% 17 10.18% 
Total private firms 126 33.78% 97 37.02% 69 41.32% 
Audit Commission 247 66.22% 165 62.98% 98 58.68% 
Total 373 100% 262 100% 167 100% 
*Basioudis and Ellwood (2005a),  **Clatworthy et al (2008),  
***Ballantine et al (2008), for a sample of acute NHS Trusts 
 
The proportion of audit work undertaken by the Audit Commission’s audit practice declined 
between 2000 and 2005. Big4 firms increased their percentage of audits (31% in 2005) with 
second tier firms almost doubling their percentage of audits between 2000 and 2005 to over 
10%. Nonetheless, the Audit Commission retained the majority of the work.  
However, FTs since their inception in 2004 have operated under a different audit regime 
from NHS Trusts.  FT boards of directors have more autonomy to make financial and 
strategic decisions and have a framework of local accountability through members and a 
board of governors, which has replaced central control from the Secretary of State for 
Health (Figure 1). FT audit committees make recommendations to the board of governors in 
relation to the appointment, re-appointment and removal of the external auditor and approve 
the remuneration and terms of engagement of the external auditor. Contrary to the principle 
established in Sharman, FTs can choose their auditor from any auditor in the market that 
complies with Monitor’s requirement in terms of expertise and standing (including prior to 
2012, the audit practice of the Audit Commission). 
 
Monitor’s regulatory role for FTs does not include the duties provided by the Audit 
Commission for NHS Trusts. It provides guidance, a Code of Governance and an Audit 
Code, and delegates limited audit monitoring to the Quality Assurance Directorate of the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales to review the audit work (a similar 
approach to that adopted by the FRC for private sector audit firms with ten or fewer ‘major’ 
audit clients). For FTs, the Audit Commission, through its audit practice, is just another 
provider of audit services. 
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Thus, the NHS provides an appropriate setting for the study of how the presence of an 
oversight body may affect audit price and quality. We have segregation of auditors 
undertaking similar work under different scenarios. One scenario covers NHS Trusts where 
an oversight body (the Audit Commission) appointed the auditor from its specialist auditors 
or accredited firms, controlled fees and scrutinised their work, this scenario has been 
examined in previous studies. A second scenario is studied in this paper, where FTs appoint 
their own auditor and there is no specialist audit oversight body. This is therefore similar to 
the future situation envisaged for all local public audit except for the presence of a specialist 
public sector auditor in  the FT audit market from 2004-2012.  
 
 
4. Determinants of audit fees in the NHS and hypotheses development 
Previous NHS audit studies have examined the NHS trust scenario. There are no published 
studies on either audit quality or audit fees in FTs. A study of audit fees in the FT sector will 
enable greater understanding of what may arise following the closure of the Audit 
Commission’s audit practice in 2012 and the later abolition of the remainder of the Audit 
Commission. The audit context of FTs has many similarities to the proposed private sector 
model, there is no audit oversight body, merely quality monitoring by the professional body 
and FTs are able to choose their own auditor. The main difference between the FT context 
prior to 2013 and the private context is the presence of a specialist public sector auditor (the 
audit practice of the Audit Commission). We develop our hypotheses in the next section 
with reference to audit fee literature in the NHS and other public and private sector contexts. 
 
4.1 Influence of size, location, risk and complexity 
Numerous studies have examined the determinants of audit fees both in the public and 
private sectors. According to these studies, audit fees are usually determined by size, 
location, complexity and risk, both in the private and the public sector. The meta-analysis 
conducted by Hay et al (2006) finds that size measures are overwhelmingly positive and 
significant in explaining audit fees both in the public and the private sector. In the UK, 
studies by Basioudis (2002), McMeeking et al (2006) and Clatworthy and Peel (2007) 
confirm similar findings. This is easily explicable as audit fees are usually based on billable 
hours and larger organisations are likely to require more auditor work in order to express an 
opinion on the financial statements. Size is typically measured by total assets, with some 
studies using revenues (Hays et al, 2006). In the NHS trust context, where the Audit 
Commission sets limits for audit fees, studies (Basioudis and Ellwood, 2005a; 2005b; 
Ballantine et al, 2008)) find that the size of the NHS trust positively impacts on audit fees. 
In this context, size is usually measured using revenues and/or total assets. The recent 
results of Xue and O’Sullivan (2013) also show that size is the main determinant of audit 
fees in the UK University context. 
The location of the auditee also affects audit fees. Cullinan (2002) posits that a city’s cost of 
living is likely to be related to an accounting firm’s billing rates. In some countries, there is 
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one metropolitan centre where costs are higher than in the rest of the country, as is the case 
in the UK (London). Of the 10 studies included in the meta-analysis conducted by Hay et al 
(2006) that specifically consider the London location of an audit client, 8 show a significant 
and positive coefficient. In the UK, Basioudis (2002) finds that audit production costs are 
associated with the geographical location of the client. Chan et al (1993) and Ezzamel et al. 
(1996) also find that audit firms charge higher fees not only for the London area but when 
they or their auditors are located in the South East of England. Beattie et al (2001), in their 
study of audit fees in the British voluntary sector, also include a variable for the London 
location of the organisations and find similar results. As presented in Section 3, the Audit 
Commission used higher fee scales for London and the South East region when determining 
audit fees. Basioudis and Ellwood (2005b) include ‘London’ as a variable in their study of 
audit fees which, as expected, is found positive and significantly related to statutory audit 
fees. However, the London premium exists when the audit practice is the Audit 
Commission, but disappears when the auditor is a private firm. Clatworthy et al (2002) note 
the influence of two NHS trust locations, London and the South East of England, and find 
that higher fees are paid in these areas in relation to the rest of England.  
 
Audit risk is another determinant of audit fees. Audit risk is associated with the probability 
of an auditors failure to detect significant errors and misstatements in the financial accounts 
which could expose auditors to liability claims and/or reputational loss. Therefore, in the 
presence of risk, auditors will include some premium, due to increased audit hours and audit 
testing or as an insurance premium (Chan et al, 1993). Some studies find a positive and 
significant association in the UK private sector (McMeeking et al 2006 and Clatworthy and 
Peel 2007). Hay et al (2006) confirm the results in their meta-analysis. In their empirical 
analysis of audit fees in NHS trusts, Basioudis and Ellwood (2005a and 2005b) find risk, 
when captured by whether the trust has incurred net losses or not, significant and positive in 
their 2005b study based on total auditor remuneration, but significant and negative in their 
2005a study on the regulatory audit fee. Thus a loss-making trust may incur further 
payments to the auditor on non-regulatory work. 
Hay et al (2006, p169) claim research studies “leave little doubt that the relationship 
between fees and complexity is positive and significant.” The more complex a client, the 
harder and more time-consuming the audit is likely to be. However, complexity is measured 
in many different ways (Hay et al 2006; Beattie et al 2001). The studies in NHS trusts use 
measures specific to the context, Basioudis and Ellwood (2005a, 2005b), similar to 
Clatworthy et al (2002), use two measures to capture complexity: 1) whether the trust 
belongs to the General Acute activity or a Multi-service activity group, because more 
complex organisations require more effort to audit than their less diverse counterparts; and 
2) the ratio of inventory to total assets, because inventory levels have traditionally impacted 
significantly on audit workload and hence audit fees. Basioudis and Ellwood find that the 
type of trust is significant and positively influences audit fees but that the ratio of inventory 
to total assets does not. 
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Clatworthy et al (2008) compare audit fees between NHS trusts and a size-matched sample 
of similar organisations in the private sector, and find significant differences in audit fees 
(higher in NHS trusts) and non-audit fees (lower in NHS trusts). In addition, they find that 
during the period 1997-2004 there was a reduction in non-audit fees. This may reflect the 
reluctance of the Audit Commission to approve any non-audit work since 2001.  
 
4.2 Big4 premium 
 The meta analysis conducted by Hay et al (2006) strongly supports big firms having 
higher audit fees. However, with the exception of Price Waterhouse in the 1980s, no 
individual large firm exhibited a fee premium. More recent studies also find a big firm 
premium. McMeeking et al (2006) report a big six premium for a sample of UK quoted 
firms over the period 1985–1995. Clatworthy and Peel (2007) find that Big4 firms and the 
next four largest mid-tier auditors have higher fees than their smaller counterparts. Hogan 
and Wilkins (2008), in an analysis of auditors' responses to control risk, find that audit fees 
are significantly higher for companies with internal control deficiencies and that  the 
incremental fee for clients of Big4 auditors is significantly higher than the incremental fee 
for clients of non–Big4 auditors. Nonetheless, the results of Griffin et al (2009) do not find 
that Big4 firms charge a premium in the New Zealand private sector context. 
 
The results of Basioudis and Ellwood (2005a; 2005b) support the existence of differential 
pricing of audit fees in NHS trusts, but only on part of the auditor remuneration related to 
regularity audit fee. For auditors' total remuneration (controlled by the Audit Commission), 
the authors found no premiums. The studies of Clatworthy et al (2000, 2002) within the 
NHS trust context, found that Big4 firms did not charge premiums. On the whole, the 
studies show the Audit Commission oversight to be effective in preventing premium 
payments to auditors, a measure that safeguards auditor independence (alongside the 
external appointments process, and auditor rotation). 
. 
 
4.3 Hypotheses 
The hypotheses are designed to identify the implications of no specialist audit oversight 
body. Based on previous research into NHS trusts and private sector audit markets, we 
identify hypotheses to investigate the audit arrangements in FTs. We aim to determine 
whether private audit firms charge audit fees on the same basis as the Audit Commission, 
i.e. the variables that determine the fees charged by private audit firms for FT audits. We 
also seek to identify whether private firms are more expensive than specialist public sector 
auditors i.e. the audit practice of the Audit Commission. We then investigate how the type 
of firm and individual Big 4 firms compare with the fees charged by the Audit 
Commission’s audit practice. The hypotheses we test are: 
 
H1: The influence of size, location, complexity and risk impacts differently on audit fees 
when the audit practice is the Audit Commission rather than a private audit firm.  
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H2: Being audited by a private firm results in higher audit fees than being audited by the 
Audit Commission’s audit practice. 
H3. Being audited by a Big4 firm results in higher audit fees than being audited by the 
Audit Commission’s audit practice. 
H4a: Being audited by PwC results in higher audit fees than being audited by the Audit 
Commission’s audit practice. 
H4b: Being audited by KPMG results in higher audit fees than being audited by the Audit 
Commission’s audit practice. 
H4c: Being audited by Deloittes results in higher audit fees than being audited by the Audit 
Commission’s audit practice. 
H4d: Being audited by a second tier firm does not result in higher audit fees than being 
audited by the Audit Commission’s audit practice. 
 
5 Data and research design  
We use data from the Annual Report and Accounts for 2009/10 for all the 117 FTs that held 
foundation trust status at 1st April 2009. The FTs comprise 70 acute hospitals; 13 specialist 
hospitals and 34 mental health hospitals.  
Table 2 shows the distribution of the audit market and audit fees of the 117 FTs included in 
our analysis. In contrast with studies presented in Table 1 private firms hold 62% of FT 
audits compared with only 41% in the NHS trust sector in 2005; Big 4  firms hold 55% but 
second tier firms hold only 7% (compared with over 10% in NHS trusts in 2005).  
 
Table 2. Distribution of auditors and audit fees in Foundation Trusts for the year 2009-10 
 Audits Audit fee* £000s 
  N % Mean  
Std. 
Dev  Min Max 
PwC 28 23.93 75.29 35.48 40.00 210.00 
KPMG 26 22.22 65.00 20.05 37.00 110.00 
Deloitte 10 8.55 93.00 44.90 51.00 172.00 
Big4 firms**    64 54.70 73.88 32.83 37.00 210.00 
2nd tier firms 8 6.84 68.00 12.74 53.00 93.00 
Total private 72 61.54 73.22 31.25 37.00 210.00 
Audit Commission 45 38.46 66.04 17.24 45.00 121.00 
Total 117 100 70.46 26.88 37.00 210.00 
Notes: 
*Excludes the audit costs of IFRS implementation if this information is stated in the 
financial statements.  
**The other Big4 firm, Ernst & Young had no NHS audits.  
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Ellwood and Garcia-Lacalle (2012) provide an analysis of FT auditors by age of FT. They 
find that as FTs mature the dominance of private firms, and in particular, the dominance of 
Big4 firms is more pronounced. Thus for FTs that have held foundation status for more than 
three years, private firms have 75% of the audits with Big4 firms holding 61% and second 
tier firms only 5%. 
To test our hypotheses, we use OLS regression models with regulatory audit fees as the 
dependent variable. In contrast to other studies that analyse both regulatory audit fees and 
total auditor remuneration, we focus our analysis on the first one because regulatory work 
represents homogeneous audit work for auditors, whereas other auditor remuneration may 
not. As independent variables, we include the control variables previously described as 
significant in explaining audit fees (size, location, risk and complexity) and variables that 
capture the auditor. We first create a ‘departure’ model that only includes the control 
variables to determine how these characteristics affect audit fees. Table 3 presents the 
control variables included in our models. 
In our model, size is represented using total assets (long term assets plus current assets). 
Within the NHS trust literature, Clatworthy et al (2002) use trust total revenue, but include 
trusts total assets as another measure of the auditee size. Ballantine et al (2008) use total 
assets as the measure of size. Clatworthy et al (2008) argue that revenue is a better proxy for 
size because the value of fixed assets may be understated. Prior to the adoption of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2009, the value of fixed assets 
excluded any assets provided through the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) since these 
remained ‘off balance sheet’. The financial statements for the financial year 2009/10 are 
under IFRS and hence we use total assets to represent the size of the FTs. Location is 
represented by a dummy variable that takes value ‘1’ if the FT is located in London or in the 
South East of England, according to the regional classification used by Monitor and the 
Audit Commission. Risk is captured by a dummy variable that takes ‘1’ if the FT incurs a 
deficit during the financial year and ‘0’ if it has obtained a surplus. Complexity is a dummy 
variable that takes ‘1’ if the FT is classified by the NHS as an acute hospital, and ‘0’ if it is 
classified as either a specialist or a mental health hospital, because these hospitals perform a 
limited range of medical treatments.  
Table 3. Main descriptive figures of control variables for the 117 NHS FTs 
    Mean  Std dev Min Max 
Size Total Assets (£000) 186,965 145,955 9,427 1,046,814 
Location 
27 FTs in London & South East (SE) of England 
  
Risk 57 FTs incurring a deficit         
Complexity 70 acute, 13 specialist & 34 mental health     
 
To test H1, prior to the introduction to the experimental variables, we conduct OLS 
regressions splitting the sample of our departure model into two sub-samples: a first sub-
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sample that only includes FTs audited by the Audit Commission’s audit practice and a 
second sub-sample with those FTs that are audited by private firms (Big4 and second tier). 
Our objective when splitting the sample in this way is to determine whether audit fees are 
determined in a similar way by the Audit Commission and private firms.  
Experimental variables are incorporated into our ‘departure’ model to test the further 
hypotheses. Auditors are classified into five categories: the Audit Commission, private 
firms, Big4 firms, non-Big4 firms and second tier audit firms, as well as individual 
categorical variables for specific Big4 firms: PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), KPMG and 
Deloitte (DE). In order to test our hypotheses related to whether private firms, in particular 
Big4 firms, and individual Big4 audit firms are able to charge a premium, we introduce into 
the departure model one more variable. To test whether private firms charge a premium over 
the Commission, hypothesis H2, we introduce a dummy variable (PRIV) which takes ‘1’ if 
the auditor is a private firm and ‘0’ if the auditor is the Audit Commission. Similarly, to test 
H3, we introduce into the departure model a dummy variable (BIG4) which takes ‘1’ when 
the auditor is a Big4 firm and ‘0’ if the auditor is the Audit Commission. To test H4a to H4d 
hypotheses, we introduce into the departure model a dummy variable (PwC for H4a, KPMG 
for H4b, DE for H4c and second tier for H4d) which takes ‘1’ if the auditor is that 
represented by its name and ‘0’ if the auditor is the Audit Commission. When testing H3 
and H4, only those FTs that meet the condition of being audited by the auditors under 
consideration are included, which reduces the size of the sample.  
 
6 Analysis of results 
Our results enable us to indicate the impact of removing an oversight body.  
Table 4. Determinants of audit fees for FTs: District Audit and private firms 
  Departure model Model 1a (AC) Model 1b (private) 
  Std Beta Signif. Std Beta Signif. Std Beta Signif. 
Size 0.531*** 0.000 0.200 0.211 0.608*** 0.000 
Location 0.225*** 0.006 0.477*** 0.002 0.176* 0.068 
Risk 0.099 0.204 0.023 0.872 0.203** 0.035 
Complexity -0.122 0.157 -0.086 0.576 -0.140 0.178 
              
  N=117   N=45   N=72   
R² 0.368   0.320   0.449   
Adj R² 0.345   0.252   0.416   
F 16.279***   4.712***   13.657***   
*Significant at 0.1, ** Significant at 0.05, ***Significant at 0.01 
 
Our departure model (Table 4) shows that of those characteristics that traditionally have 
been reported as influencing audit fees (size, location, risk and complexity) only size and 
location are positive and significant for FTs. Thus a different fee structure is likely to occur 
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with no Audit Commission oversight. Table 4 also shows the result of the ‘departure’ model 
when the sample is split to consider the type of auditor: Audit Commission (model 1a), and 
private firms (model 1b), in order to test our first hypothesis. When the regression is carried 
out considering those FTs audited by the Audit Commission only location is found positive 
and significant. When the regression is carried out considering FTs audited by private firms 
three factors are found significant and positive: size, location and risk. Moreover, the ability 
of the model (R²) to explain the dependent variable, that is, audit fees, rises from 0.320 for 
model1a to 0.449 for model 1b. This supports our hypothesis H1, that is, private firms have 
different considerations from the Audit Commission when determining their fees.  
The inclusion of the PRIV variable (‘1’ if the auditor is a private firm and ‘0’ if it is the 
Audit Commission) in model 2, to test H2, shows that, in addition to size and location, 
being audited by a private firm results in significantly higher fees than those audited by the 
Audit Commission (see Table 5). This effect is more evident when the variable included is 
BIG4, to test H3, whether the Big4 firms charge a premium to their auditees in relation to 
the Audit Commission (Table 5). In this case, the value of the coefficient (std beta) and the 
significance of the variable BIG4 and the R² (0.409) of the model are higher than in model 
2, which includes the variable PRIV.  
In model 3 (Big4 firms), risk becomes more important (though only significant at the 0.1 
level). These results support our hypothesis H2 and H3, that is, private firms, and in 
particular Big4 firms, charge higher fees than the Audit Commission. 
 
Table 5 Comparison of audit fees of private firms and the Audit Commission’s audit practice 
  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4a Model 4b Model 4c Model 4d 
  Std Beta Sig. Std Beta Sig. Std Beta Sig. Std Beta Sig. Std Beta Sig. Std Beta Sig. 
Size 0.527*** 0.000 0.517*** 0.000 0.452*** 0.000 0.279** 0.048 0.441*** 0.001 0.178 0.235 
Location 0.225*** 0.005 0.246*** 0.004 0.334*** 0.002 0.324*** 0.010 0.236* 0.064 0.442*** 0.002 
Risk 0.129 0.103 0.146* 0.079 0.064 0.545 0.173 0.163 0.053 0.635 0.032 0.816 
Complex -0.130 0.126 -0.110 0.216 -0.079 0.482 -0.055 0.679 -0.169 0.172 -0.094 0.511 
PRIV 0.151** 0.048                     
BIG4    0.164** 0.038                
PwC         0.172* 0.092             
KPMG           0.072 0.521         
DE                 0.272** 0.017     
2ndtier                   0.018 0.892 
                        
  N=117  N=109   N=73  N=71   N=55   N=53   
R² 0.390  0.409   0.391  0.236   0.453   0.265   
Adj R² 0.362  0.380   0.345  0.177   0.397   0.187   
F 14.177***   14.237***   8.598***   4.019*** 8.104*** 3.387**   
* Significant at 0.1,  **Significant at 0.05,  *** Significant at 0.01 
 
Models 4 (also Table 5) show that PricewaterhouseCoopers (model 4a), but especially 
Deloitte (model 4c), are able to charge premiums fees when compared to the Audit 
Commission, as their coefficients are positive and significant. Therefore, hypotheses H4a 
and H4c are supported. Neither KPMG (model 4b) nor second tier firms (model 4d) charge 
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premiums to their auditees. Therefore, H4b is rejected whereas H4d is supported. In these 
models, the size and location variables are positive and significant, except for the model 4d, 
second tier firms, in which only location is significant.  
 
7 Discussion and conclusions 
 
The results provide insights into how local public audit in England may develop without the 
Audit Commission. Established in the 1982 Local Government Finance Act, the Audit 
Commission appointed auditors from private firms and from its audit practice to local public 
bodies, it controlled audit fees, determined the scope of audits and monitored audit quality. 
In recent years it had also assessed the performance of local authorities and NHS trusts 
according to national criteria. However, since 2004, the introduction of FTs in the NHS in 
England provided an area of local public audit not overseen by the Commission but where 
the Commission’s audit practice continued to provide a regulatory audit service. The Audit 
Commission recovered its costs largely through its audit fees. Comparative price and quality 
analysis of the audit fees within the FT audit market and the audit arrangements across the 
NHS (with and without Audit Commission oversight) enables consideration of the impact of 
the removal of the Audit Commission to be explored.  
In relation to price, we find that size and location are the only significant factors influencing 
FT audit fees prior to drilling down to analyse the fees by the type of auditor. Private firms, 
however, consider risk as also important when determining fees. In the NHS trust audit 
market, the Audit Commission provided an indemnity for auditors’ work, in the FT sector 
no such indemnity applies. When the Audit Commission is removed from the equation, risk 
features in audit fee pricing. 
 
Our findings support the hypothesis that being audited by a private firm, results in higher 
audit fees than being audited by the Audit Commission’s audit practice. Specialist public 
sector auditors are less expensive than private auditors.  We also find support for a Big4 
premium i.e. Big4 firms have higher fees than other auditors. However, when examining the 
fees of individual Big4 firms we find evidence that Deloitte charges premium fees (and also, 
at a 10% level of significance, PwC), but no premium is apparent for KPMG. On the other 
hand, being audited by a second tier firm does not appear to give rise to premiums compared 
with the Audit Commission’s audit practice. Unlike in the NHS trust sector where studies 
have shown (Clatworthy et al, 2000 and 2002; Basioudis and Ellwood, 2005b) that, on the 
whole, the Audit Commission’s control of audit fees prevented premium payments, 
premiums are evident when Audit Commission oversight is removed. A higher proportion 
of other auditor remuneration to total auditor remuneration was also evident: 36% in FTs 
compared with 23% in NHS trustsvii. This indicates the Audit Commission was more 
effective in maintaining auditor independence through restricting non audit fees. 
Furthermore, the presence of a specialist auditor provides a benchmark that reduces audit 
fees. 
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As discussed in Section 2, higher audit fees charged by large audit firms may be indicative 
of audit quality. The common argument put forward for this higher quality is the ‘deep 
pockets’ of the large firms that places them more at risk from litigation. However, we found 
evidence that Big4 firms restrict their liability when auditing FTs. Most FTs audited by Big4 
firms disclose a limitation of the responsibilities of the auditor (mainly between £0.5 and £1 
million).  
For example:  
‘The engagement letter signed on 31 March 2010 states that the liability of 
KPMG, its members, partners and staff (whether in contract, negligence or 
otherwise) in respect of services provided in connection with or arising out of 
the audit shall in no circumstances exceed £1million in the aggregate in respect 
of all such services.’ 
(Cambridge University Hospitals FT, Annual Report and Accounts 2009/10, 
Disclosure Note 3.) 
 
In the FT sector, Big4 premium fees are not indicative of higher quality audits because of 
deep pockets –the pockets are stitched. In the NHS trust sector, the audit work was set and 
monitored by the Audit Commission. Monitor, the regulator for FTs, asked the Quality 
Assurance Directorate of the ICAEW to review the audit work in FTs (a system similar to 
proposals for all local public audit in future), the 2008/09 review found an audit by the 
Audit Commission’s audit practice to be unprecedented in having no improvement points 
(Audit Commission, 2010b). This suggests that specialist auditors provide exemplary 
quality. 
 
Audit quality is strongly related to independence (De Angelo, 1981). In the NHS trust sector 
(as in most areas of local public audit in England), the Audit Commission appointed the 
auditors and therefore increased the independence of the auditor from management. The 
governors of Foundation Trusts appoint the auditors on advice from the Audit Committee. 
This reduces the independence of the auditor. In the private sector, adherence to stewardship 
codes is often dependent on the shareholders to enforce.  
 
However, whilst the governors (see Figure 1 earlier) may be in a similar role to shareholders 
in appointing the directors, they do not have the same ownership interest. It is the 
government (Department of Health) that holds the dividend capital on which FTs are 
founded; the government that receives the dividends and, via commissioning bodies, 
provides finance for local services. Thus, there is also a need for auditors to report in the 
interests of the general tax payer and their representatives. Substituting a private sector 
(shareholder model), does not provide this important second level of agency accountability 
–the protection of the public purse.  
 
There are incentives for management to manipulate financial statements For example, FTs 
pay a dividend (3.5%) to the Department of Health based on the value of their net assets. If 
a FT impairs its assets it has a lower asset value and pays less cash to the government in 
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dividends. However, governors of the FT may see such an adjustment as furthering the FT’s 
service objectives through ensuring more cash remains with the FT. Unlike shareholders, 
they will not suffer a reduction in their wealth from asset write downs or a reduction in their 
income from lower dividends. Furthermore, the impairment does not affect the EBITDA 
(Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation), the performance measure that 
Monitor has primarily used to assess FT performance against plans. Ellwood and Garcia-
Lacalle (2012b) show impairments in 2009/10 were £2.5bn for all FTs (and £1bn in 
2010/11). One FT impaired its new hospital by over £240m, resulting in negative equity and 
no dividend payments, but the accounting adjustment received no publicity in the local 
press. The impairment did not feature in the audit report from the Big4 firm that had audited 
the statements each year since the FT was formed in 2004 and limited its liability to 
£500,000. The governors have no direct financial link with the FT unlike shareholders who 
appoint the auditors of companies. They will not suffer any direct financial loss if the assets 
of the organisation are impaired or dividends reduced. FTs receive their funding from 
central government (via commissioning bodies) not through local charges or taxes. The 
auditors are appointed by governors and they report to governors stating their liability is 
only to the audited body.  
“This report is made solely to the Board of governors of University Hospitals 
Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust (‘the Trust’) in accordance with Schedule 
10 of the National Health Service Act 2006. Our audit work has been 
undertaken so that we might state to the Board of Governors of the Trust as a 
body, those matters we are required to state to them in an auditor’s report and 
for no other purpose. To the fullest extent permitted by law we do not accept or 
assume responsibility to anyone other than the Board of Governors of the Trust 
as a body, for our audit work for this report or for the opinions we have 
formed.” 
(University Hospitals Birmingham FT, Annual Report and Accounts 2010/11, 
Extract from the Audit Report.) 
 
There appears to be a missing level of audit and accountability – to the government and the 
wider tax payer providing the funds. This level is missing both in terms of the appointed 
auditors and the Secretary of State’s ‘armchair auditors’ who may pick up excessive 
expenses or remuneration, but are unlikely to question technical accounting adjustments of 
many millions of pounds, particularly if they have a beneficial financial effect on their local 
hospital. Not only has the army of armchair auditors failed to materialise but also the band 
of armchair accountants necessary to interpret the information. 
 
Audit arrangements after the removal of the Audit Commission 
 
In 2010, the Secretary of State for Local Government announced his intention to disband the 
Commission. Audit functions would move to the private sector within a framework 
overseen by the National Audit Office (NAO) and the accounting profession. The NAO 
would report to Parliament on the VFM and productivity of the sector. 
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The process to outsource the work of the Audit Commission’s in-house audit practice 
(which covered 70% of the audits in local government and NHS trusts) commenced in 
September 2011 and, in March 2012, the award of five year audit contracts to four private 
firms starting from 2012/13 was announced. Two Big4 firms, KPMG LLP and Ernst & 
Young LLP, were awarded annual contracts of £23.1m and £20m respectively. The lion’s 
share of the work, £41.3m, was awarded to Grant Thornton (UK) LLP, and the DA 
Partnership (formed by former Audit Commission staff but a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Mazars LLP) was awarded only £5m. These contracts were heralded as showing the extent 
of the Audit Commission’s unique purchasing power and would contribute to an up to 40% 
cut in audit fees paid by local public bodies.  
 
At first glance, such huge savings and the introduction of two new audit firms (Ernst & 
Young and DA Partnership) may seem testimony to the decision to remove the Audit 
Commission as an unnecessary expense, but it was the Audit Commission that oversaw the 
contracting process and exerted its power to achieve these savings –‘it is only a halfway 
house’ (Parker, 2012). In the tendering process, the Audit Commission was a huge bulk 
purchaser of NHS and local government audits that could offer high volumes in return for 
lower unit costs. This power to achieve savings through bulk buying presumably disappears 
when the Commission goes. The scope of the audit has also been considerably reduced. The 
DA Partnership, comprising former Audit Commission practice staff was intended to 
operate as a mutual organisation, but with only one contract of £5m this is not a viable 
proposition and hence, it will operate as a wholly owned subsidiary of the second tier audit 
firm Mazars. Thus, there is likely to be considerable audit concentration in the future 
without the alternative of a public sector or mutual organisation alternative.  
 
Implications for the future of audit in local public bodies 
Our study of the audit arrangements for FTs gives an insight into what may arise for local 
public audit (local government and health) when an audit oversight body is disestablished. 
Greater concentration (as indicated above) without the Audit Commission and no specialist 
public sector auditor is likely to lead to an escalation of audit fees and other auditor 
remuneration.  The independence of the auditor is reduced as the organisation appoints its 
auditor. There are fewer safeguards to audit independence and hence audit quality, the 
interests of governors may not necessarily align with the interests of central government (the 
major funder of the NHS and local government) or the taxpayer.  
 
Professional oversight under the FRC, similar to the regime for company audits is planned 
(DCLG, 2012), this largely mirrors Monitor’s arrangements for FTs. However, as Cooper 
and Robson (2006) observe, conglomerate accounting firms have become less the subject 
and more the site of professional regulation. Humphrey et al (2009) note how many 
decisions relating to how audits are conducted and audit firms are organised are made on a 
global basis by accounting firms and private standard setting bodies. The removal of 
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specialist auditors and the Audit Commission, even with an increased role for the NAO, 
may have significant implications for the nature and scope of local public audit. 
 
Audit fees paid to private firms were higher than those paid to the Audit Commission’s 
audit practice. Unlike the regime in the NHS trusts, where the Audit Commission had 
oversight, premiums were paid to some Big4 firms. Our study found premium payments to 
Deloitte and to a lesser extent PwC (neither of these two firms won tenders under the 
outsourcing of the Audit Commission’s audit practice work in 2012), but analysis of FT 
auditors shows that, given the freedom to appoint their own auditors, FTs migrate to Big4 
firms. Audit fee premiums are likely to increase when there is no benchmark public sector 
auditor and no collective oversight of fees. Thus, the envisaged savings in audit fees may 
not materialize in the future.  
 
Further research is necessary to understand any changes in audit quality relating to the 
removal of the Audit Commission’s monitoring of the work and the benchmark level of 
quality provided through its own audit practice. The FT market shows the incentives and 
scope for accounts manipulation that could be to the detriment of the tax payer and central 
government though not necessarily the recipients of audit reports. The substitution of a 
private sector audit model into local public audit without the financial interest of 
shareholders to press for audit quality leaves the general taxpayers’ interest vulnerable. 
 
We have focused on the regularity audit fee, but there are also consequences from the 
reduction in audit scope –VFM work is left more to the National Audit Office, audit 
inspection and assessment are removed, as is other work such as the data assurance 
programme for the NHS Payment by Results (tariff system). The reduction in scope of the 
audit function will have direct cost savings (though perhaps not as high as announced if the 
public sector bodies  purchase the services excluded from the contracts separately) and there 
may be costly indirect consequences. There has been no evaluation of the effect on 
performance of removing the Audit Commission’s assessment regime. Further research is 
needed on this issue.  
 
Conclusions 
Audit quality including audit independence is an important aspect of public accountability 
in a democratic society. An audit oversight body for local public audit can improve audit 
independence through control of auditor appointment processes, fees and other payments. 
This reduces the scope for ‘cosiness’ between auditors and their auditees and was a 
fundamental principle set out in Lord Sharman’s review of UK public audit. The provision 
of specialist auditors, the monitoring of audits and provision of a forum for discussion of 
public service all enhance audit quality. Within the FT sector, where the Audit Commission 
has never appointed auditors, the audit arrangements allow premiums to be paid to Big 4 
firms and for the firms to limit their liability. Audit fee payments to private firms exceeded 
those paid for regularity work to the specialist audit practice of the Audit Commission.  
There are indications that manipulation of accounting statements can occur in local public 
 20 
bodies which may be against the taxpayers’ interest, but not necessarily against those who 
appoint the auditor and to whom they report. The private sector audit model jeopardises 
auditor independence and leaves the taxpayer vulnerable particularly without further 
safeguards against cosy relationships between auditors and their client. 
 
The outsourcing of the Commission’s audit practice work in health and local government in 
2012 achieves considerable savings in audit fees through a bulk tendering process by the 
Audit Commission. However, we are not led to conclude that an oversight board is an 
unnecessary expense. Our findings show it had an important role in the price and quality of 
audit. Following the Audit Commission’s abolition, it is likely that fees will rise when 
individual local public bodies appoint their auditor, particularly Big4 auditors. The absence 
of a public sector alternative or benchmark will lead to higher fees. The new arrangements 
reduce audit independence and may significantly reduce audit quality. There may be savings 
on performance assessment, VFM and inspection, but much further research is needed to 
assess the indirect costs associated with the change in scope and nature of local public audit. 
The findings in this study, show private firms to be more expensive and the substitution of a 
private sector (shareholder) model of audit appointment and reporting reduces independence 
and the assurance of audit quality in local public audit. The abolition of a specialist 
oversight body reduces protection for the public purse.  
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i The Code of Recommended Practice for Local Authorities on Data Transparency 2011 stipulates several 
recommended minimum disclosures e.g. ‘expenditure over £500 (including costs, supplier and transaction 
information)’. The information is made available through open government licence 
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence 
 
ii Section 8 of the Audit Commission Act 1998. 
 
iii The 1972 Local Government Act allowed local authorities to choose their own auditors –either District Audit 
or a private firm of auditors. However, the 1976 Layfield Committee review of local government finance 
concluded that it was wrong for any public body to be able to choose its own auditors. Nevertheless, the 
situation remained until the 1982 Local Government Finance Act established the Audit Commission. 
 
iv In the UK, local government was exclusively audited by the District Audit Service for 130 years until the 
Local Government Act 1972.  
 
v  ‘District Audit’ did not exist as a separate agency of the Commission throughout the Commission’s life. We 
use ‘audit practice’ for the Commission’s in house auditors. 
vi The Audit firms undertaking more than ten audits of companies of major public interest are subject to 
inspections which include a review of their policies and procedures supporting audit quality. The largest four 
firms are subject to inspection on an annual basis and other major firms on an extended cycle of up to three 
years. Prior to 1 April 2013 the reviews of policies and procedures of those firms with ten or fewer ‘major’ 
audit clients were delegated to the professional bodies with which they were registered for audit purposes e.g. 
ICAEW. From 1 April 2013 the inspections of these firms are delegated in full to the professional bodies such 
as ICAEW. 
vii Based on the auditor remuneration for 121 NHS trusts as shown in the NHS (England) Summarised 
Accounts 2009-2010 (HC410). 
